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REGULATING SPORTS AGENTS: WHY CURRENT
FEDERAL AND STATE EFFORTS DO NOT DETER
THE UNSCRUPULOUS ATHLETE-AGENT AND
HOW A NATIONAL LICENSING SYSTEM MAY
CURE THE PROBLEM
ERIC WILLENBACHERt
"It's not show friends, it's show business."
Bob Sugar'
INTRODUCTION
The life of a sports agent is an attractive one for many people who
grew up following professional sports. Numerous young men and women
fantasize about the prospect of spending their time around professional
athletes, living a luxurious lifestyle, and earning a small fortune collecting
commissions on playing and endorsement contracts.' Television programs
such as HBO's Arliss and movies like Jerry Maguire serve to further
romanticize the profession. Unfortunately, the allure of life as an agent has
created an influx of potential agents vying for a very limited number of
professional athletes and an even smaller group of superstars.
Aspiring agents have used illegal, unethical, and unscrupulous
methods in collecting clients, and states have been largely unsuccessful at
t J.D. Candidate, June 2005, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., 2002, School of
Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University.
Bob Sugar is a ruthless sports agent character played by actor Jay Mohr in the movie
JERRY MAGUIRE (TriStar Pictures 1996).
1 See Bryan Couch, Comment, How Agent Competition and Corruption Affects Sports and
The Athlete-Agent Relationship and What Can Be Done to Control It, 10 SETON HALL J. SPORT
L. 111, 112 (2000) (explaining the increased importance of agents because of the variety of
functions they provide including financial management, accounting, public relations, investment,
tax and estate planning, and legal counseling).
2 See 149 CONG. REC. H4895, 4896-99 (daily ed. June 4, 2003) (statements of Reps.
Steams, Gordon, Sensenbrenner, Jackson-Lee, Osborne, Cannon and Dingell) (outlining the
systemic problem of unscrupulous agents and the unfettered damages they cause to student-
athletes and universities); Kenneth L. Shropshire, Sports Agents, Role Models and Race-
Consciousness, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 267, 271-73 (1996).
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regulating the industry.3 The purpose of this Note is to examine current
and proposed deterrents for athlete-agents who choose to conduct
themselves with disrepute. Part I of this Note will examine the effects that
unprincipled agent conduct has on student-athletes, universities, and
collegiate athletics in general. Part II introduces Congress' recent attempt
at regulating this issue through a law entitled the Sports Agent
Responsibility and Trust Act while Part III focuses on pre-existing federal
and state mechanisms that are intended to deter sports agents from
engaging in certain activities. In Part IV, this Note asserts that Congress'
recently enacted statute will be ineffective because its enforcement
provisions are no stronger than deterrents already in effect. Thus, it is
asserted that the new law will be largely unsuccessful in regulating the
industry. Finally, this Note concludes with suggestions on how Congress
can effectively combat overreaching agents.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE SPORTS AGENT INDUSTRY
A. The Size of the Industry
Currently, the magnitude of the athlete representation industry is
staggering. For example, just five years ago, well-known sports agent
David Falk sold his company to SFX Entertainment, Inc. for over $100
million in cash and stocks.4 At the time of the transaction, Falk had just
twenty-five employees and approximately forty clients, making the size of
the transaction even more impressive. In 2000, SFX was subsequently
sold to Clear Channel Communications for a staggering $4.4 billion.6
Firms like SFX and International Management Group boast revenues and
profits in the hundreds of millions of dollars.7
3 See infra Part IV (examining why current attempts at regulation are unsuccessful).
4 See Couch, supra note 1, at 112; Mark Hyman, Sparks Fly at Management Powerhouse
SFX, Bus. WK ONLINE, June 18, 2001 (discussing how the sale was consummated for $120
million), at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01 -25/b3737094.htm.
5 Couch, supra note 1, at 112 (citing Stefan Fatsis, Michael Jordan's Agent Scores Big in
Takeover Deal, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1998, at B13). It is also important to note that Michael
Jordan was one of Falk's clients and accounted for a disproportionate amount of Falk's revenues.
See Stefan Fatsis, Michael Jordan's Agent Scores Big In Takeover Deal, WALL ST. J., May 5,
1998, at B13.
6 See Hyman, supra note 4 (discussing how Falk was stepping down as Chairman of the
multi-million dollar conglomerate to focus on personal issues).
7 Dan Harkins, The Art in the Deal, OHIO BUS. MAG. ONLINE (2003) (stating that IMG is a
"global sports marketing empire now raking in about $1 billion in annual revenues"), at
http://www.ohiobusinessmagazine.com/ME2/default.asp; Associated Press, Clear Channel
Communications at a Glance, KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 29, 2002 (finding that SFX Sports Groups
accounted for nine percent of $8.5 billion in corporate revenues which is roughly $765 million in
revenues).
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However, in April 2002, the NFL Players' Association reported that
while there were nearly 1200 certified player agents, almost 800 of them
did not have a single client, a statistic probably echoed in all the major
sports leagues. 8  As a result, the competition for these athletes has
intensified to the extent that many agents have become willing to do
whatever it takes to corral college athletes into signing an agency contract
before they have finished. college or officially declared themselves
professionals.
9
B. Why Sports Agents Engage in Unethical Activities
While prospective agents hope to "cash in" by representing athletes,
the players' associations in each of the four major sports have limited the
amount of commissions that an agent can collect for negotiating a player
contract.' 0 In response to the numerous actors in the market and the limit
on commissions, competition among agents has erupted, causing a race to
the bottom where sports agents conduct themselves unethically in order to
secure clients.'" Even courts have fostered this competition by declaring
that agents who attempt to steal athletes from each other through empty
promises of more money or better promotional opportunities are not liable
for fraud or interference with contract.12 Generally, courts have found that
an agent is not liable for attempting to steal an athlete from a competitor as
long as the agent was engaging in competition rather than intentionally
causing the breach of contract. 13 This has created a precariously fine line
8 Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act: Hearing on 108 H.R. 361 Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 4,
7 (May 15, 2003) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Rep. Tom Osborne). See generally Peter
Larsen, Agents and Labor: 'There Aren't Enough Jobs Out Therefor Everyone,' SPORTS BUS. J.,
at http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/index.cfin?fuseaction=page.page&pageld=89 (last
visited Oct. 20, 2004) (discussing the competitive nature of the business at length).
9 See Hearing, supra note 8, at 3-7 (statement of Rep. Tom Osborne) (detailing personal
accounts of agent overreaching).
'0 See Couch, supra note 1, at 113 n.11.
1 See Rick Carroll, Reputation Stains Sports Agents, DALLAS Bus. J., July 1, 1996 (noting
that the industry is so competitive that one has to act illegally or unethically to break into the
business), available at http://dallas.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/1996/07/0l/story2.html?pagel;
Couch, supra note 1, at 113 (noting that in 1992, there were 200 agents registered with the Major
League Baseball Player's Association and only 150 had clients).
12 E.g., Speakers of Sport, Inc. v. ProServ, Inc., No. 97-C7853, 1998 WL 473469, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 1998) (holding that a contract between Ivan Rodriguez and Speakers of Sport
did not prevent Proserv from attempting to lure Rodriguez away if it could justify its statements
to him as opinions about what the company's marketing could do for him); see also Couch,
supra note 1, at 116-18.
13 Couch, supra note 1, at 116-19.
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between legal and illegal conduct, where agents have free reign to steal
each other's clients even if they are under contract.
In order to compete with large firms, individual agents with fewer
resources resort to unethical and even illegal behavior.1 4 Most often, they
engage in what amounts to extreme sales puffing, routinely overestimating
the value of a student-athlete in order to convince him to join the agent's
client stable. 15 Additionally, when agents are unable or unwilling to meet
with athletes directly, they employ runners to do their bidding. 16  This
occurs because various states, 17 the National Collegiate Athletic
Association ("NCAA"), 8 and individual colleges 19 put laws and rules into
effect that attempt to limit the ability of an agent to infiltrate a campus.
Therefore, a runner will befriend the student-athlete and then advertise
himself to agents as a conduit,2° offering his services as a close friend of
the athlete and someone who can exert great influence over the decisions
he makes. 21 Additionally, an agent may already employ the runner and
just implant him on the campus to pass money, cars, and other gifts to the
athlete to induce him into signing an agency contract before he leaves
college. 22 The agent or runner may even pass illicit drugs to the student-
athlete if he desires.23 Unfortunately, all of these practices are flagrant
violations of NCAA Bylaws which, if discovered, result in the loss of the
athlete's college eligibility and severe penalties on the university for which
he played, whether or not the school knew or should have known about the
infraction.24
14 H.R. REP. No. 108-24, pt. 1, at 2 (2003); see Carroll, supra note 11 (finding that in order
to break into the industry, people have to do unethical or illegal things); Todd L. Erdman, The
Long Awaited Quadruple Play: Proposed Amendments to Four Major Areas of the Alabama
Athlete Agents Regulatory Act of 1997, 8 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 191, 193-94
(1997) (noting also that agents circumvent the laws to sign athletes).
15 See, e.g., Speakers of Sport, Inc., 1998 WL 473469, at *4-5 (holding that an agent
engaged in competitive salesmanship when he attempted to lure Ivan Rodriguez away from his
current agent); see also H.R. REP. No. 108-24, pt. 1, at 2; Couch, supra note 1, at 112.
16 See Hearing, supra note 8, at 6 (statement of Rep. Tom Osborne); Couch, supra note 1,
at 120.
'7 See, e.g., COLO REv. STAT. §§ 23-16-105 to -107 (2003) (prohibiting athlete-agents from
entering campus unless they comply with a university monitored program).
18 See NCAA OPERATING BYLAWS art. 12, § 12.3 (2003-04) (prohibiting certain types of
contact with agents), available at http://www2.ncaa.org/legislation and governance/rules and b
ylaws.
19 See Couch, supra note 1, at 120.
20 See id.; see also Hearing, supra note 8, at 6 (statement of Rep. Tom Osborne).
21 See Couch, supra note 1, at 120-21.
22 Id.
23 Edward Vincent King, Jr., Practical Advice for Agents: How To Avoid Being Sued, 4
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 89, 92 (1993).
24 NCAA OPERATING BYLAWS, §12 (Amateurism) (2003), at http://www2.ncaa.org/legislat
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William S. Saum, the NCAA Director of Agent, Gambling and
Amateurism Activities, has commented that "agents, motivated largely by
financial considerations, are willing to use any means necessary to
represent a student-athlete who has even a remote chance of playing
professional sports. 25 He noted that they often resort to "secret payments
or gifts (goods, autos, cash, clothing) to the athlete, undisclosed payments
to friends and relatives who may be in a position to influence the athlete,
unrealistic promises and considerable arm-twisting., 26  There have even
been instances where agents have made payments to athletes or their
families and then threatened to disclose the gifts to the NCAA Committee
on Infractions if the athlete does not execute an agency contract with
him.27 These threats, which are essentially blackmail, put athletes in an
extremely vulnerable position when they or one of their family members
may have been taken advantage of or have unknowingly accepted gifts or
loans.
C. Effects of llegal Agent Activities
These unscrupulous agent activities have severely negative effects
upon both the athletes and the universities for which they play. These
practices can result in loss of athlete eligibility, substantial team and school
penalties, and sanctions on universities that include repayment of money,
loss of scholarships, less television revenue, post-season play ineligibility,
and game forfeitures.28 Unfortunately, it is not just the potential superstar
ion andgovemance/rules and-bylaws (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
25 Hearing, supra note 8, at 13 (statement of William S. Saum, Director, Agent Gambling
and Amateur Activities, NCAA).
26 Id.; see Press Release, Senator Ron Wyden, Wyden Seeks to Limit Misleading Tactics of
Sports Agents Courting Student Athletes (June 3, 2003), available at http://wyden.senate.gov/
media/2003/06032003_sparta.html. But see ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS 26
(1999), available at http://faculty.oxy.edu/whitney/classes/saccess/csp/ncaaaz.htm. Student-
athletes may also just want a larger share of the revenue they produce. While they potentially
contribute millions of dollars in wealth to the University and their respective coaches are
compensated in the seven-figure range, student-athletes are given nothing more than a
scholarship for their services. Thus, athletes may be tempted into accepting moneys to receive
their fair share, especially those who come from poor families and whose only motivation to
attend school was to become a paid professional. Id. at 26-29 (examining also the pay-for-play
movement in the NCAA).
27 H.R. REP. No. 108-24, pt. 1, at 2 (2003); Press Release, Senator Ron Wyden, supra note
26 (discussing how some agents resort to blackmail to retain clients); see also infra note 35
(discussing the plight of Marcus Camby).
28 See Hearing, supra note 8, at 6-7 (statement of Rep. Tom Osborne); H.R. REP. No. 108-
24, pt. 1, at 2. Agents have also committed various other types of injuries to the athlete including
"(1) income mismanagement; (2) excessive fees; (3) conflicts of interest; (4) incompetence; (5)
overly aggressive client recruitment practices; (6) disruption of existing contractual relationships;
and (7) misappropriation of funds entrusted to the agent by the athlete." Rob Remis, Analysis of
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that agents pursue. They generally employ these extreme measures for
client recruitment when there is even a minute chance of an individual
becoming a paid professional.29 Meanwhile, the NCAA has estimated that
a college athlete has just a one percent chance of making a professional
team at all. 30 Thus, while one's initial inclination may be that a student-
athlete suffers little more than loss of eligibility on his way to a highly paid
professional career, this viewpoint is not in line with reality. An athlete
who violates the NCAA Bylaws on Amateurism through his conduct with
an agent not only loses his eligibility, but his college scholarship as well,
which may, in turn, result in him leaving school for financial reasons and
failing to ever earn a degree. 3' Tom Osborne, a Nebraska Congressman
and former Head Coach of the national champion Nebraska Cornhuskers
has also pointed out that "[w]hen a sports agent promises student-athletes
fame and fortune--or a first-round draft selection-a focus on
superstardom and wealth may prevent them from considering the
consequences of signing away their NCAA eligibility. 32 As a result, one
onlooker has commented, "[A] youngster gambling his future on a pro
contract is like a worker buying a single Irish Sweepstakes ticket and then
quitting his job in anticipation of his winnings." 33  One particularly
discouraging example is the well-known story of Lenny Cooke, a star high
school basketball player who was misled by those around him.34
Civil and Criminal Penalties in Athlete Agent Statutes and Support for the Imposition of Civil
and Criminal Liability Upon Athletes, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 1, 7-8 (1998). For a list of
NCAA imposed penalties on students and universities in violation of NCAA regulations, see
NCAA BYLAWS § 19.5 (Enforcement, Penalties) (2003).
29 See Hearing, supra note 8, at 1 (statement of Rep. Chris Cannon).30 See id. at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Chris Cannon); NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N,
FACT SHEET, tbl. 5 (2003) available at http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/ed-outreach/research
/fact sheet 11_02.htm (expounding upon research results showing that the probability of
advancing from NCAA athletics to a professional team for each sport is as follows: men's
basketball, 1.3%; women's basketball, 1.0%; football, 2.0%; baseball, 10.5%; men's ice hockey,
4.1%; men's soccer, 1.9%).
31 See Hearing, supra note 8, at 6 (statement of Rep. Tom Osborne) (detailing his
supposition with anecdotal evidence); ZIMBALIST, supra note 26, at 52.
32 Hearing, supra note 8, at 6 (statement of Rep. Tom Osborne).
33 ZIMBALIST, supra note 26, at 26 (quoting Tom McMillen, former college and NBA
basketball player, former member of Congress and co-chair of the President's Council on
Physical Fitness).
34 Cooke was a highly touted high school basketball player, whose fame soared after he
played Lebron James, the 2003 top NBA draft selection, at a summer camp. He was sought after
by numerous agents and professional scouts, all of who promised him that he would be a top
draft pick. Unfortunately, after entering the draft, Cooke was never selected and, as of the writing
of this paper, is in the United States Basketball League, a type of minor league where he makes
just $400 per week. Cooke, who never graduated high school, can trace his downfall to the
agents and "friends" who told him to concentrate on his game and forego college. He is the
quintessential example of someone who was a victim of unscrupulous agents and self-promoters
1230 [Vol.78:1225
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In contrast to student-athletes who are victims of sports agents, there
are many athletes who know full well what they are doing by accepting
gifts from agents. These athletes knowingly jeopardize their NCAA
eligibility and their school's reputation by accepting such items from
potential agents and are then subject to agent manipulation. One such
example is Marcus Camby, a basketball star at the University of
Massachusetts in the mid 1990s. Camby violated NCAA rules by
accepting gifts from agents and later found himself the unwitting victim of
his unscrupulous agents.35
Meanwhile, schools suffer a great deal from agent activities that
violate NCAA Bylaws, including team and school penalties, loss of
revenues, loss of post-season eligibility and damage to their reputations.36
From 1985 to 1996, the average number of major NCAA infractions
resulting in school probation and restrictions on scholarships and recruiting
has remained steady at approximately thirteen per year, while minor
infractions remain far more numerous.37 In a well-publicized incident, the
who promised him the world and advanced him money and gifts when they believed he was a
rising star, but quickly deserted him when he got injured, went undrafted, and the hype
surrounding him faded. Michael O'Keeffe, Cooke is Hungry for Success: Lenny Tries to
Rebound After Run-In With Lebron, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 22, 2003, at 90; see also J.A.
Adande, Man of the Moment? It Has To Be James, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2003, at D9 (discussing
James' future as the top draft pick and consensus future superstar).
35 Between October 1994 and April 1996, Camby accepted money, rental cars, jewelry and
other gifts from agents John Lounsbury and Wesley Spears. Spears' overreaching went so far as
to draft a lawsuit against Camby for the money owed him after Camby did not sign with him and
Lounsbury. Spears delivered the draft to the home of Camby's mother in an effort to embarrass
Camby and his family and pressure him into returning the under-the-table payments before the
press learned about the misconduct. Camby, who is not without blame for knowingly accepting
the money and gifts, found himself in an even more precarious position as, so he alleged, Spears
tried to blackmail him into signing an agency contract with pictures of Camby and a naked
woman at Spears' home and other stories of furnishing Camby with prostitutes. The University
of Massachusetts was stripped of its 1996 regional championship and ordered to return the
money it earned in reaching the Final Four that year while Camby found himself the prey of
vicious agents who threatened to ruin his reputation and future endorsement prospects. See
Associated Press, Lawyer Reprimanded in Camby Case, Jan. 29, 2001 available at
http://www.umasshoops.com/history/alumni/marcus-camby/news/agent-incidentand-punchja
n200 1.htn (last visited Oct. 31, 2004); Associated Press, Would-be Agent Says He Bought Right
to Represent Camby, Feb. 17, 1999 available at http://www.umasshoops.com/history/alumni/mar
cuscamby/news/agent02171999.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004); see also Couch, supra note 1,
at 126.
36 See supra note 28 and accompanying text; see also Kevin Stangel, Protecting
Universities' Economic Interests: Holding Student-Athletes and Coaches Accountable for Willful
Violations of NCAA Rules, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 137, 139 (2000) (discussing how NCAA
violations severely damaged the reputation of the University of Minnesota in the eyes of the
public and legislature according to the chairwoman of the Higher Education Finance Committee
in Minnesota).
37 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 26, at 46.
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University of Michigan was recently penalized for money and loans that
star basketball player Chris Webber received from a booster between 1988
and 1993, even though the school was unaware of the payments.38 As a
result of Webber's transgressions, Michigan was placed on two years of
probation-making it ineligible for post-season play, was forced to forfeit
112 games from the 1990s, lost one scholarship per year for four years
beginning in 2004, 3 9 and was required to return $450,000 in NCAA
tournament revenues. 40  Furthermore, the NCAA erased Webber's name
from all record books41 and subjected the University of Michigan to a great
deal of embarrassment, turning a once-revered program into an
unattractive school for recruits.42 While the overreaching in this instance
was caused by a "booster" of the program, rather than an agent, the
repercussions that such conduct has on the university is evident.
In addition to the damage that these unethical activities bring to
student-athletes and universities, the conduct of unethical agents causes all
of intercollegiate athletics to suffer.43 These continuing scandals create a
negative perception of college athletics as a whole and vilify the specific
school and student involved.44 Meanwhile, the agent who caused the
NCAA violations and antecedent scandal is not publicly attacked with the
same force and fervor as the student(s) and university, because he is not
the well-known public figure that an athlete or university is. 45
38 Gennaro A. Filice IV, Chris Webber Pleads Guilty; Former Michigan Basketball Star
Erasedfrom Record Books, MICH. DAILY, July 22, 2003, available at http://www.collegesports
.com/sports/m-baskbl/uwire/072203aaa.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2004). But see Dan Wetzel,
Michigan Apologetic, But More Penalties Likely on Way, CBS SPORTSLINE, Nov. 7, 2002, at
http://cbs.sportsline.com/b/page/pressbox/0,1328,5868431,00.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2004)
(indicating that Michigan should have known better because "programs throughout the Big Ten
and the nation" were always suspicious that Coach Steve Fisher's program was plagued by
violations).
39 See Filice, supra note 38 (noting that all of these penalties caused the school to lose
money).
40 See Wetzel, supra note 38.
41 See Filice, supra note 38.
42 Wetzel, supra note 38 (noting that Michigan Athletic Director, Bill Martin, felt that
having to remove the commemorative banners from the years in question was like a dagger in his
heart).
43 See Hearing, supra note 8, at 6-7 (statement of Rep. Tom Osborne).
44 See id.
45 See id.; Peter Hockaday, Wyden 's Bill Could Lessen Agents' Power, OR. DAILY
EMERALD ONLINE ED., June 4, 2003, at http://www.dailyemerald.com/vnews/display.v/ART/20
03/06/04/3edelb4l84fD2 (last visited Oct. 31, 2004) (noting that an agent is often not held
accountable for the damage he caused).
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D. Inability of a University to Protect Itself
While it may seem unfair that universities are punished by the NCAA
when, unbeknownst to them, their student-athletes are breaking NCAA
rules with agents, courts continue to enforce NCAA penalties against both
the universities and athletes. Appealing to judicial forces is a futile
practice for athletes or universities looking for relief from NCAA
regulations. For example, in Gaines v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass 'n,46 the Tennessee District Court enforced NCAA rules and denied a
football player continued college eligibility after he entered the NFL draft
and was not selected even though he never signed with an agent or
professional team nor accepted money or gifts from either.47 Gaines had
challenged the NCAA's eligibility rules as a violation of anti-trust laws.
The court held that the NCAA Bylaws were not subject to anti-trust
challenges and that even if they were, they had a legitimate business
justification.48  Similarly, in Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n,49 the district court upheld the NCAA's academic standards for
eligibility challenged by a learning-disabled plaintiff. The court found that
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,50 the Sherman Act, 5' and
various state statutes did not apply to the NCAA's promulgation of
eligibility requirements. 2
The above examples serve to illustrate that courts are unwilling to
reverse NCAA rulings or find its Bylaws illegal. If federal courts will not
monitor the NCAA in anti-trust and disability areas, it seems unlikely that
a plaintiff will be successful in having an NCAA penalty or regulation
overturned in any arena. Thus, universities and athletes who are unwitting
victims of sports agents who cause NCAA violations can expect to have
little success appealing assessed penalties.
II. THE SPORTS AGENT RESPONSIBILITY AND TRUST ACT
In response to the unethical and illegal activities of sports agents, and
the egregious consequences and damages that results from their conduct,
both the House of Representatives and the Senate introduced a bill to
punish unscrupulous agents. The Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust
46 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
47 Id. at 740-41.
48 Id. at 744-47.
41 9 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D.N.J 1998).
'0 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2003).
52 Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 499 (holding that similar state anti-trust and common law duties
did not apply).
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Act 53 ("SPARTA") aimed to deter sports agents from engaging in certain
overreaching activities and to prevent the unknowing violation of NCAA
regulations by universities and athletes.54 The bill had three primary
objectives. First, it established as illegal certain activities by agents
relating to the signing of contracts with student-athletes.55 This is the true
substance of the act in that it defines the duties of sports agents and
prohibits certain conduct.5 6 The last two objectives dealt with punishing
sports agents who violate the law through fines and civil actions by
universities and state attorneys general. Specifically, SPARTA's second
objective was to treat violations of the Act as unfair or deceptive acts or
practices of trade to be regulated by the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") under 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B).57  Thus, it effectively gives
jurisdiction to the FTC and allowed the commission to issue penalties in
accordance with its powers. 58 The last objective of the Act was to give
institutes of higher learning and state attorneys general a federal cause of
action for damages caused by agents who violate the law.59
While the disclosure requirements and the prohibited activities of
SPARTA will not be analyzed here, and are to be presumed sufficient to
" See S. 1170, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 361, 108th Cong. (2003).
"4 See Hearing, supra note 8, at 7 (statement of Rep. Tom Osborne); H.R. REP. No. 108-24,
pt. 1, at 2 (2003) (stating that the goal of SPARTA "is to define the prohibited conduct employed
by [agents] ... as well as require written disclosure to the student athlete prior to signing a
contract and to the educational institution after a contract has been entered").
51 See S. 1170, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003); H.R. 361, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. REP. NO. 108-
24, pt. 2, at 8 (2003) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner discussing what is prohibited by the Act);
149 CONG. REc. H4895, 4898 (daily ed. June 4, 2003) (statements of Reps. Osborne and Cannon
outlining certain conduct surrounding agency contracts that is to be prohibited under SPARTA to
protect the student-athlete). Among the activities prohibited include: (1) recruiting or soliciting a
student-athlete to enter into an agency contract by giving false or misleading information,
making a false promise or representation, or providing anything of value to the athlete or anyone
associated with the athlete before entering into such a contract; (2) entering into an agency
contract with a student-athlete without providing a required disclosure document signifying the
loss of NCAA eligibility; (3) predating or postdating an agency contract. It also requires: (1)
disclosure to the student-athlete that a written or oral agreement of representation will cause loss
of NCAA eligibility; (2) both the athlete and agent to notify the athletic director at the athlete's
educational institution that the athlete has entered into an agency contract within 72 hours or
before his/her next athletic competition, whichever is earlier. S. 1170, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003);
H.R. 361, 108th Cong. (2003); see Press Release, Senator Ron Wyden, supra note 26.
16 See S. 1170, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003); H.R. 361, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003).
57 S. 1170, 108th Cong. § 4; H.R. 361, 108th Cong. § 4.
58 S. 1170, 108th Cong. § 4; H.R. 361, 108th Cong. § 4; H.R. REP. NO. 108-24, pt. 2, at 4
(June 2, 2003) (stating that one of the purposes of the law was to designate certain conduct by
sports agents as unfair and deceptive acts regulated by the FTC).
59 S. 1170, 108th Cong. §§ 5-6; H.R. 361, 108th Cong. §§ 5-6; H.R. REP. NO. 108-24, pt.
2, at 4 (stating that the Act gives either the FTC, the attorney general for the state, or the
university harmed, a cause of action for economic damages).
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achieve the intended goal, the penalties and consequences imposed for
violating the law merit further discussion. 60 This Note asserts that making
violations of the law unfair and deceptive practices of trade, and creating a
civil remedy for state attorneys general and universities against agents
violating the act, are insufficient proposals that will not deter agents from
engaging in unscrupulous activities. Simply put, SPARTA is not strong
enough to reach its goal of preventing certain agent activities because
various state and federal deterrents for sports agents already exist, and
SPARTA's penalty provisions are no stronger than deterrents that have
already proved unsuccessful.
III. PRE-SPARTA: LAWS AND CAUSES OF ACTION INTENDED TO DETER
SPORTS AGENTS FROM ENGAGING IN CERTAIN ACTIVITIES
A. Existing Federal Deterrents
Several federal criminal laws already exist that should deter certain
agent activities. Though these federal laws seem to carry greater
penalties-such as jail time-than FTC violations or civil suits, they have
not deterred sports agents from engaging in illegal conduct.
In the revolutionary case of United States v. Walters,61 an Illinois
District Court convicted Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom of mail fraud,
conspiracy, and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO")
Act violations.62 Walters and Bloom were sports agents who specialized in
representing college football players by secretly signing them to agency
contracts and then forcing them to lie about the existence of their contracts
on NCAA eligibility forms so they could continue to receive scholarships
and play football for their respective schools.63 They provided signing
bonuses in cash, loans, cars, and other gifts and postdated the signed
agency contracts so that the students could retain their eligibility.64 In all,
Walters and Bloom recruited fifty-eight college players, but were such
poor negotiators that all but two athletes signed with other agents upon
graduating from college.65 Instead of suing the athletes for the return of
the money, loans, and gifts they bestowed upon them, Walters and Bloom
60 This Note will focus on the last two objectives of SPARTA, which can be encapsulated
as an attempt to deter sports agents from engaging in certain activities.
61 704 F. Supp 844 (N.D. Ill. 1989), rev'd, 913 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1990).
61 913 F.2d at 389-90 (noting that that the circuit court did reverse on procedural grounds).
63 Id.
64 Id.; see also Couch, supra note 1, at 121-23.
65 913 F.2d at 390 (stating that most athletes dismissed Walters and Bloom as their agents
because they "felt cheated by [their] clandestine tactics").
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personally threatened the athletes in an attempt to enforce the contracts.66
A jury found them guilty of various counts of mail fraud, RICO violations,
and conspiracy to commit mail fraud and sentenced Walters to five years
in prison followed by five years probation and Bloom to three years in
prison followed by five years probation.67 While the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit eventually reversed the decision for procedural
errors,68 the impact of the case was far-reaching. It meant that sports
agents would now be subject to various white-collar crimes and that their
activities could be punished under certain federal laws even if their
conduct was common among other dishonest agents.69 While the prospect
of jail time should have served as a significant deterrent to agents engaged
in this conduct, the congressional testimony of Representative Osborne
70
and William Saum,7 1 an NCAA Executive, tells us that these same
problems persist today.
In addition to Walters, the Securities and Exchange Commission has
investigated whether sports agents have illegally served as financial
advisors to their clients.72 For example, David Dayton Lukens, a
California investment adviser, was forced to settle a lawsuit instituted by
the SEC accusing him of stealing more than $25 million from various
athlete investors.73 The prospect of SEC inquiries should serve as a
deterrent to sports agents as well.
B. State Criminal and Administrative Statutes
In addition to federal laws that can potentially punish unscrupulous
agents, there are many state statutes that attempt to regulate agent
conduct.74 Some academics believe that states are motivated to regulate
athlete-agents by economic principles and should be left alone to do so.
75
66 Id. (finding that while their attorneys found the contracts enforceable, despite their
violations of NCAA bylaws, Walters and Bloom attempted to enforce them on their own rather
than through a judicial process).
67 Id. at 390-91.
68 Id. at 393.
69 See Couch, supra note 1, at 122-23.
70 See Hearing, supra note 8, at 3-7 (statement of Rep. Tom Osborne).
71 See id. at 13-14 (statement of William Saum).
72 See Couch, supra note 1, at 133.
73 See, e.g., Michael O'Keeffe, Money Men in Demand: There Are 1,600 Agents and
Advisers Vying for a Piece of the $2.5 Billion NFL Players Will Earn, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr.
27, 2003 (including victims such as Simeon Rice, Eric Dickerson and Shannon Sharpe).
74 E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 18895-97 (Deering 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.411e (2003); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. §§ 2051.001-.553 (Vernon 2004); see also Diane
Sudia & Rob Remis, Athlete Agent Contracts: Legislative Regulation, 10 SETON HALL J. SPORTS
L. 317, 319 n.2 (2000) (describing various state laws that regulate athlete-agent contracts).
75 Diane Sudia & Rob Remis, The History Behind Athlete Agent Regulation and the 'Slam
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Specifically, state economies generate a great deal of money through high
profile NCAA football and basketball programs and when these programs
suffer from NCAA penalties, the economic impact can be felt throughout
the state. 76 This is especially true of state-funded institutions, which, if
they do not generate athletics revenues, must supplement the university's
funds with additional tax dollars. 77 The effects of this revenue shifting can
be felt by out-of-state students, university employees, and other residents
of the state. 78 Thus, states have great incentive to create statutes restricting
agents' conduct in addition to protecting student-athletes.
As of the writing of this Note, more than half of the fifty states have
passed athlete-agent signing statutes that attempt to regulate agent
activities.79 Many of these statutes have provisions similar to SPARTA,
but have not successfully deterred the prohibited conduct. 80 Approximately
half of the jurisdictions that have these statutes require the agent to register
with the state and pay registration fees. 81 An example of a typical statute is
California's, which forbids the agent or his representative from offering or
providing money or anything of value to the student-athlete.82 The law
also limits athlete-agent contact and provides civil and criminal penalties
ranging from fines of up to $50,000 to one year in jail.83 However, while
this law exists, there have been relatively few cases where agents have
seen any real jail time8 4 and the prospect of fines is not a true deterrent in
this industry.85 Many statutes also expressly require that the agent provide
Dunking of Statutory Hurdles,' VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 67, 70-73 (2001).
76 Id. 70-71. The money generated by athletics is typically reinvested in numerous pursuits
of the university.
" Id. at 72-73.
78 Id. at 72-73 (examining the consequences to a state, such as lost scholarship
opportunities for out of state students, employee lay-offs, and tax increases within the state).
79 Sudia & Remis, supra note 74, at 319 n.2; e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 18895-97;
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.41 le; TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 2051.001-553.
'0 See infra Part 1V.B-C.
81 Couch, supra note 1, at 131.
82 Id. (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 18895-18897.97 (West 1997)).
83 Id. (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 18.897.8, 18897.93 (West 1997) (allowing an
agent to be imprisoned or fined the maximum amount)); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 18897.93 (giving courts the right to suspend or revoke a person's ability to continue business as
an athlete-agent).
84 An extensive Westlaw and Lexis search did not uncover a case where anyone was
sentenced to jail time. While such cases may exist, they are presumably rare. Moreover, in 1993,
there were only twenty-two agents registered in the entire state of California, yet many agents
continued to do business in the state without penalty, including Leigh Steinberg, a well
publicized football agent. See King, supra note 23, at 92. It has been suggested that the state just
"has better things to do than send out the state's attorney to chase down agent regulation
violators." Id.
" See infra Part IV.A.
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notice of an agency contract to certain entities and individuals.86  Some
statutes require that the agent provide such notice within a certain time
frame and regulate the content of the notice while others further establish
requirements in which the contract execution must occur.87 These types of
provisions are not significantly different from the provisions in both the
regulating and enforcement provisions of SPARTA.88
Generally, the statutes impose administrative fines and penalties on
the agent as well as make certain conduct a criminal offense punishable as
either a misdemeanor or felony, depending on the jurisdiction.89 However,
many of the statutes criminalizing conduct have found the criminal prongs
of their law unenforceable because of vagueness and lack of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. 90 Thus, states have resorted to prosecuting
agents under other state statutes dealing with bribery and unlawful trade
practices. 91 Recently, in 2001, William "Tank" Black was convicted in
Florida of fraud, conspiracy and obstruction of justice in connection with
his activities as a player agent.92  Specifically, he was accused and
convicted of stealing over $14 million from athletes. 93  In sum, there
already exist many state penal deterrents for agents who may wish to act
unethically and cause athletes and schools to violate NCAA rules.
C. State Civil Statutes
In additional to criminal penalties, state legislatures have introduced
civil remedies for states, universities, athletes, agents, and other injured
parties to pursue against unscrupulous sports agents.94 These civil
provisions include the denial, suspension, or revocation of an agent's
registration or license, and have been adopted by California, Florida, and
86 Sudia & Remis, supra note 74, at 324.
87 See id
81 S. 1170, 108th Cong. §§ 3-7 (2003); H.R. 361, 108th Cong. §§ 3-7 (2003); see also
supra Part II.
89 See Sudia & Remis, supra note 75, at 84.
90 See generally id. at 87-91 (discussing an agent's ability to avoid agent laws by signing
and executing out of state contracts and by exploiting various loopholes in state laws).
91 See, e.g., Abernethy v. State, 545 So.2d 185 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (while the jury trial
found the defendant not guilty of bribery and unfair trade practices, the potential for prosecution
under these laws did exist). However, Abernethy also held that an agent who gives student-
athletes money and gifts could not be convicted of tampering with a sports contest. Id. at 191.
92 David Aldridge, Agents of Change See Slow Progress in Sports, ESPN.COM, Feb. 28,
2002, at http://espn.go.com/columns/aldridgedavid/1342031.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
93 id.
94 See generally Sudia & Remis, supra note 75, at 83 (noting that over twenty athlete-agent
statutes provide civil remedies for injured parties); Remis, supra note 28, at 13-22 (discussing
various types of civil and administrative provisions aimed at regulating the sports agent including
subjecting him to suit by universities and athletes).
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Pennsylvania along with numerous other states.95 Many states also provide
that agent contracts entered into in violation of state law-while the
student has not declared his intention to become a professional to his
university-are either void or voidable. 96 Commonly, the statutes also
provide that agents forfeit their right of repayment for the services, money
and gifts conferred on the student-athlete when agent contracts are entered
into illegally.
97
Most importantly, state statutes create private causes of action for
injured persons, universities or student-athletes. However, the scope of the
potential plaintiffs does vary from state to state-some allow any damaged
party to seek relief and others only allow athletes to do so. 98 The various
state statutes provide for damages including "actual damages ... punitive
damages ... court costs... attorney fees... equitable relief ... and treble
damages .... 99
D. State Common Law
There also exist common law actions for universities, student-athletes,
and state attorneys general to pursue. Thus, even if a particular state has
not provided for civil penalties or causes of action for injured parties, the
common law may provide a remedy. For example, many state courts have
found that a contractual relationship exists between a student-athlete and a
university and that either party may bring an action against the other for
breach of contract. 100 Courts have based this finding on the premise that
the financial benefits bestowed on the student are valid consideration for
their agreement to play, thus creating the contractual relationship.101 The
examples are numerous.
As far back as 1972, in Taylor v. Wake Forest University,10 2 the North
Carolina Court of Appeals held that a contract existed between the
university and a student-athlete and his father. 10 3  Taylor agreed, in
accordance with his scholarship, to abide by NCAA regulations, follow the
95 Remis, supra note 28, at 12-14 (finding such laws also exist in Alabama, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington).
96 Id. at 15.
97 See id. at 15-16.
98 See id. at 17-20 (noting that most states that create these causes of action generally just
provide actions for the athlete and the university and not all persons who were consequently
injured).
99 Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted).
100 See Stangel, supra note 36, at 140-42.
101 Id. at 140-46.
102 16 N.C. App. 117 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
103 See id at 121-22 (finding proper consideration was received on each side).
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training schedule for the football team, and to maintain a minimum grade
point average in addition to other requirements. °4 Taylor and his father
subsequently decided that he could circumvent certain training rules in
order to maintain "reasonable academic progress."' 1 5  As a result, the
university terminated Taylor's scholarship and Taylor sued. 10 6 The court
consequently dismissed Taylor's suit because it held that Taylor violated
the contract between the parties when he did not comply with the team's
training rules and physical eligibility requirements. 10 7 Thus, if the court
was willing to find a breach of contract for violation of training rules the
court, presumably, would also find a breach of contract when the athlete
fails to conform to NCAA eligibility requirements that were also an
element of the contractual relationship.
Similarly, in Williams v. University of Cincinnati,10 8 an Ohio court
found that a contractual relationship existed between a basketball player
who had signed a national letter of intent to play basketball and the
University of Cincinnati. 10 9 The court held that Williams had become
academically ineligible after he failed to complete junior college as
required by his scholarship and financial aid agreements which were valid
contracts.11° The court also found that the university did not violate the
contract by failing to sufficiently appeal the NCAA's ruling that Williams
was ineligible."' In fact, the court declared that the student was the one
who had violated the contractual relationship by failing to remain
academically eligible. 1
2
There are numerous jurisdictions that have made similar findings. In
Hendricks v. Clemson University,1 3 the South Carolina Supreme Court
also recognized that many aspects of the student/university relationship are
contractual. 1 14 In Carr v. St. John's University,1 5 the New York Court of
104 See id. at 121 (concluding that the scholarship Taylor received was valid consideration
in exchange for abiding by these requirements).
105 Id.
06 Id. at 121-22.
107 Id. (holding that Taylor could not insert his own academic standards clause and that this
was not an ambiguity in the agreement).
"' 112 Ohio Misc. 2d 36 (Ohio Ct. Claims 2001).
109 Id. at 47 (finding valid consideration was received on either side of the agreement).
"o Id. at 46-47 (holding that Williams did not pass the proper classes to allow him to
graduate from junior college and thus make him eligible to play basketball for the University of
Cincinnati).
"' Id. at 46-47 (finding that the University was not responsible for fighting the actions of
the NCAA to unreasonable ends).
112 Id at47.
113 578 S.E.2d 711 (S.C. 2003).
114 Id. at 716-17 (holding that the university did not expressly or impliedly promise to
ensure student's athletic eligibility in exchange for his baseball scholarship and that it was only
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Appeals held that a contractual relationship existed between the student
and the private university to which the student was admitted.1 16 In Begley
v. Corporation of Mercer University, 11 7 a Tennessee district court held that
Begley, an aspiring basketball player, had violated his scholarship contract
by failing to achieve a minimum grade point average.' 1 8 There, the court
also held that the university did not assume the risk that a student would be
declared ineligible by the NCAA even if it should have known the player
was ineligible at the time of contract. 19
The above cases demonstrate that many state courts recognize that the
relationship between an institute of higher learning and a student-athlete is
contractual in nature. It is asserted that if a contract exists between the two
parties, the university has the ability to bring an action against the student
for breach of contract, which includes a violation of NCAA eligibility
requirements outlined in the agreement. 120  Therefore, it follows that a
university could also bring an action against an athlete for consequential
damages that were reasonably foreseeable,' 2' which may include assessed
penalties on the university. While contract law generally does not allow a
party to sue for punitive damages, an exception is generally made for cases
of fraudulent or outrageous conduct, 122 which the violation of NCAA rules
may constitute. In summary, a university that enters a contractual
relationship with a student based on a scholarship or financial aid may sue
a student in breach for compensatory, consequential, and/or punitive
damages.
discussed after his enrollment).
".. 12 N.Y.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962), aff'g 17 A.D.2d 632, 231
N.Y.S.2d 410, (2d Dep't 1962).
116 Carr, 17 A.D.2d at 633, 231 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
117 367 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
11 Id. at 910.
1'9 Id (holding that the school was not required to sustain a scholarship to a student-athlete
who failed to meet academic requirements even if the school feared that such an outcome was
possible or even likely when it extended the scholarship).
120 But see Stangel, supra note 36, at 147-48 (arguing that, because the NCAA generally
requires that national letters of intent, scholarship agreements, financial aid agreements, and
student-athlete statements be uniform, that courts may view these agreements as adhesion
contracts and unenforceable if there are any shocking clauses). Also, some statutes bar suits
against students for violations of NCAA regulations. Id. at 150.
121 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS 525 (6th ed. 2001) (discussing how
consequential damages are permissible when they are foreseeable and arise from the
circumstances of the contract); see also U.C.C §§ 2-712(2), 2-715 (2003).
122 See FARNSWORTH ET AL., supra note 121, at 18 (explaining that punitive damages are
allowed for tortuous conduct that is sufficiently outrageous). This could also give rise to a
common law fraud action if the athlete knowingly made a false representation to the university
before entering into the contract. See Stangel, supra note 36, at 150-51.
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Moreover, the university also has a common law action against a
sports agent who causes an NCAA violation because he has tortiously
interfered with its contract with the student-athlete. Generally, the tort of
interference with contractual relations requires that the conduct is
intentional, it interferes with the contract-usually, but not always,
requiring that the defendant cause the party to break the contract-the
defendant knew that the contract existed, and the plaintiff suffered some
sort of pecuniary damages. 123 This tort remedy should be available against
an agent because, presumably, he will always know or have constructive
knowledge that the student-athlete has some sort of scholarship, financial
aid agreement, or national letter of intent with his university and that
violating NCAA rules breaches that contract. Furthermore, violating
NCAA regulations will cause the university pecuniary damages, in the
form of penalties, under the NCAA Bylaws. 24  Thus, when the agent
intentionally showers the athlete with gifts, loans, and other benefits, the
agent is interfering with the contract and subject to suit. Of course,
tortious interference with a contract generally gives rise to punitive
damages if the defendant's actions were intentional and without
justification. 12 5 This potential for suit should serve as a deterrent to sports
agents who design to interfere with student contracts with universities.
IV. CURRENT LAW DOES NOT AND WILL NOT DETER SPORTS AGENTS
FROM ENGAGING IN UNSCRUPULOUS ACTIVITIES
A. SPARTA's Penalties and Civil Causes ofActions Are Not Substantially
Different from Existing Law
These state and federal laws have not deterred the sports agent from
overreaching and facilitating the violation of NCAA Bylaws. 126 It seems
that the problem lies in the penalties, remedies, and potential deterrents the
statutes attempt to employ. On the one hand, SPARTA is essential in
creating a uniform national code of conduct and requirements for sports
agents. 127 It imposes statutory regulations on agents in half of the fiftystates where such laws do not exist 128 and creates uniformity in the others
123 See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 1078,
1106 (10th ed. 2000).
124 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 123, at 1106 (postulating that a plaintiff may sue a third
party for tortuous interference with a contract in addition to suing on the contract).
126 See supra Part I (discussing the current problems in the industry).
127 See S. 1170, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003); H.R. 361, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003).




so that agents cannot take advantage of ambiguities in certain states. 129
However, the deterrents imposed by SPARTA, the creation of a civil cause
of action for universities and state attorneys general, as well as FTC
penalties, are not substantially different from deterrents that already
exist. "°
First, finding an unfair or deceptive act or practice affecting
commerce will only cause the FTC to order the actor to cease such
activity.' 31 If the actor continues the unfair practice, the Commission may
then seek a maximum civil penalty of $11,000 for each act.132 This fine is
certainly on par with criminal and civil penalties that already exist on state
and federal levels.' 33 In fact, some states, like California-a state where
many agents originate-have civil penalties that rise to $50,000.' 4
Moreover, state statutes and common law already give universities the
ability to sue agents who violate the law, as Congress proposes.
35
SPARTA does not provide any further deterrent. 136 If SPARTA's penalty
and remedy provisions are no different from those that already exist, it
begs the question: How will SPARTA effectively stop sports agents from
engaging in these activities? The uneasy answer is that it will not. If the
current deterrents are not working, then SPARTA, whose deterrents are
strikingly similar to those already in effect, will be just as ineffective in
keeping unscrupulous agents out of the athlete-representation industry.
B. Civil and Criminal Penalties Do Not Deter Sports Agents
It seems that the reason criminal and civil penalties are insufficient
deterrents to illegal agent activity is because agents have far too much to
gain from signing a potential superstar to be deterred by fines and other
129 See supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting how agents may avoid state laws due
to lack of personal jurisdiction or vagueness); see also Robert N. Davis, Exploring the Contours
of Agent Regulation: The Uniform Athlete Agents Act, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (2001)
(noting that state laws do not require reciprocal enforcement or registration requirements).
130 See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(2), 45(g) (2003).
132 15 U.S.C. § 45(1)-(m), amended by 16 CFR § 1.98 (2003) (raising the FTC fine in 15
U.S.C. § 45(l)-(m) from $10,000 to $11,000).
133 See supra Part III.A-B.
134 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
131 See supra Part III.C.
136 See S. 1170, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 361, 108th Cong. (2003). But see Sports Agent
Responsibility and Trust Act: Hearing on 107 H.R. 4701 Before the Subcomm. On Commerce
Trade and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong.
19-24 (June 5, 2002) (statement of Howard Beales, Director of the Bureau of Consumer
Protection at the Federal Trade Commission) (stating that the FTC has the authority to institute
civil actions seeking civil penalties, restitution or "disgorgement to the U.S. Treasury of
defendants' ill-gotten gains").
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penalties. 137 Currently, the average salary for a professional athlete is well
over a million dollars per year: the NBA's average salary is $4.5 million;
MLB is $2.4 million; the NHL is $1.6 million; and the NFL pays
approximately $1.1 million per year.138 Therefore, if an agent is able to
secure just two NFL players as clients and takes just a four percent1 39
commission on the players' salary, he will be able to collect $88,000 for
negotiating their contracts. 140  Though this does not seem like a lot of
money on its face, this assumes that the agent only represents two average
players. It also does not factor in any potential promotional contracts that
he secures. If, for instance, an agent is able to secure just one superstar
athlete, like Lebron James, whose average salary is between four and five
million dollars per year 141 and who earned over $100 million in
endorsement contracts before he even played a game, 42 the deal becomes
much more lucrative as the agent could earn well into seven or eight
figures, considering commissions on endorsement deals grow to 10-
20%. 143 Thus, an agent who can secure just a handful of superstars or a
stable of average players has earnings potential of well into the millions of
dollars. 144  It is preposterous to assume that penalties of $1 1,000-as
137 Hearings, supra note 8, at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Chris Cannon) (finding that there is
too much money to make as a successful sports agent to be deterred by monetary penalties); id at
4-8 (statement of Rep. Tom Osborne) (same).
138 Thomas Heath, Below the Red Line; As a Majority of Teams Appear to Lose Money,
Expansion and Soaring Salaries are Blamed, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2003, at DOt.
139 Michael Cohen, Meet the Real Jerry Maguires, BOSTON BUS. J., Oct. 5, 1998 (finding
that the average commission for player contracts is between three and five percent), available at
http://boston.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/1998/10/05/focusl .html; Eric Fisher, The LuridLure
of Money, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Apr. 16, 2001, at 22 (declaring that commissions on playing
contracts generally cap out at 4%).
140 This is because four percent of $2.2 million (two average NFL players) is $88,000 (.04 x
$2.2 million).
141 Tom Withers, No. I Draft Pick LeBron James Close to Signing with Cleveland
Cavaliers (July 2, 2003) (reporting that James will "make $4.02 million (2003-2004), $4.32
million (2004-2005) and $4.62 million (2005-2006) over the next three seasons"), available at
2003 WL 58532546.
142 See Matt Hayes, It's LeBron's World, SPORTING NEWS, July 21, 2003, at 2
(hypothesizing about whether the media attention surrounding Lebron James will translate into
playing success); Tom Withers, Lebron James Hits Jackpot with Endorsement Deals, USA
TODAY.COM, May 22, 2003, at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/draft/2003-05-22-
james-deals x.htm.
143 See Bill Borrows, Show Me the Money: New Sitcom Trevors World Of Sport Takes a
Free Kick at the Cut-Throat Game of the Celebrity Sports Agent, THE GUARDIAN (London),
Aug. 9, 2003, at 8 (discussing the potential to make commissions on various services as a sports
agent); Fisher, supra note 139, at 22 (stating that commissions can reach as high as 20%).
144 An agent who can corral a modest client base of five all-star NBA players can earn up to
$6.15 million per year or more. This is because four percent of a player's salary of approximately
$12 million is $480,000; multiplied by five players, the amount rises to $2.4 million. Plus,
considering that an all-star player may earn an additional $5 million per year in endorsements, a
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proposed in SPARTA-will deter an agent from engaging in this
enormous opportunity. There is simply too much to gain as a successful
agent to be deterred by fines this low.
Some onlookers, however, believe that sports agents are currently
undeterred because they can simply headquarter themselves in a state
without substantial athlete-agent laws.1 45 While there may be some merit
to this viewpoint, the low monetary penalties also have a correlative effect
and cannot be disregarded. Simply stated,
The multimillion-dollar value of professional athlete salaries, signing
bonuses, and endorsement contracts has resulted in a proliferation of
unscrupulous practices by some sports agents.... [A]gents, or their
representatives, are willing to break the rules in order to sign promising
student-athletes to an agency contract. Agents are willing to do this
because the fees that accompany the representation of a professional
athlete are considerable, and the consequences that the agent will suffer
• • " • 146
in comparison to the athlete or school are limited or non-existent.
Thus, while SPARTA's FTC penalties of $11,000 per violation may
dissuade an aspiring agent with little equity from acting illegally when
attempting to enter the industry, it is not likely to deter an unscrupulous
lawyer or businessman with capital reserves hoping to catalyze a career as
a sports agent.
C. The Potential for Civil Causes ofAction Does Not Deter Agents
Similarly, SPARTA's proposal of a federal cause of action for
universities against athlete-agents will not deter sports agents from
participating in illegal activities. As stated above, SPARTA's creation of a
civil remedy for universities is not a novel concept as universities already
have the ability to sue sports agents under state statutes and common
law.1 47 However, universities have traditionally not taken advantage of
this remedy for a variety of reasons. 148
College sports are big business and universities make too much
money from these programs to engage in publicized and damaging
fifteen percent commission on $5 million is $750,000; multiplied by five players, the amount
rises to $3.75 million. If the agent combines this with a dozen other average to below average
players, his earnings are even larger.
45 Hearing, supra note 8, at 7-9 (statement of Rep. Bart Gordon).
146 H.R. REP. NO. 108-24, pt. 1, at 2 (2003) (emphasis added).
147 See supra Part III.C-D.
.8 But see Associated Press, Michigan Wants Webber to Pay Legal Fees (Sep. 18, 2003)
(reporting that the University of Michigan will seek to recoup legal fees and lost tournament
earnings from former student-athlete, Chris Webber, for breach of contract for knowingly
causing NCAA violations), available at http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=1618310.
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lawsuits. 149 In 2001, the average NCAA Division I-A program had
revenues of over $25 million, 150 with the most successful program raising
nearly $80 million. 151 Moreover, the average Division I-A university had
554 student participants spread out among nineteen sports, 52 but the great
majority of its revenues, an average of $14,560,000, came from men's
basketball and football programs, 53 whose participants are the most likely
targets of sports agents. With all of this money coming into the university,
it is not surprising that colleges are hesitant to upset this delicate balance.
It is asserted that the lucrative revenues from some college sports present a
very strong motive for universities to keep NCAA violations out of the
public eye and to avoid potential fines, probations, and penalties. While
there is no reliable data on the number of NCAA violations that have gone
unpunished, one can hypothesize that coaches, athletic directors, and other
university officials have addressed at least some potential violations "in
house" without ever making them public. 154 An additional problem for
universities hoping to recover damages against agents is that some agents
are judgment proof. Because there exists just a one percent chance that a
college athlete will make a professional team, even in a backup role, 155 the
athlete and aspiring agent that cause a violation may not be able to pay a
damage bill of six to seven figures to the university. 56 Instead of facing
the wealthy agent who is undeterred by fines, the university must confront
the agent who has no ability to satisfy a judgment. When one combines
the judgment-proof agent with the potential loss of revenue that a
university could suffer, it is asserted that the incentive to cover up such
violations and not bring action against an unethical agent is strengthened.
However, even if an agent is not judgment proof, and the NCAA
violation has already been discovered and sanctioned by the NCAA
Committee on Infractions, the school may still be hesitant to pursue a civil
suit against an agent or student-athlete for numerous reasons. First, such a
149 See Stangel, supra note 36, at 151-52.
150 DANIEL L. FULKS, REVENUES AND EXPENSES OF DmSION I AND II INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS PROGRAMS: FINANCIAL TRENDS AND RELATIONSHIPS 2001, at 10 tbl.2.1 (2001),
available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/research.html#participation-rates (last visited Oct. 20,
2004).
151 Id. at 15 tbl.2.4.
152 Id. at 10tbl.2.1.
53 Id. at 22 tbl.3.2.
154 See Wetzel, supra note 38 (suggesting that the basketball coach was aware of NCAA
violations but did not address them).
155 Hearing, supra note 8, at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Chris Cannon).
156 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (stating that a very large percentage of agents
do not have athletes under contract and are without clients).
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suit could negatively affect the university's reputation. 157  Universities
already receive a great deal of criticism due to low graduation rates and the
perception that they take advantage of student-athletes. 158 They also face
the prospect of being perceived as hypocritical when they attempt to
persuade the public that athletics are merely secondary to education and
then sue their student for money. 59 Some commentators argue that
"[l]egal action... could make a philosophical statement that universities
are more concerned with operating a business than educating their student-
athletes."'160  Instituting lawsuits against student-athletes or agents only
stands to keep the controversy and rule violations in the public eye for a
longer period of time.1 61 This, in turn, may damage the reputation of the
university and hurt recruiting in addition to shrinking the general applicant
pool. There is no question that it affects the school's ability to recruit new
athletes because a litigious university is an unattractive one for athletes
with professional aspirations. 62  If a high school athlete is choosing
between two colleges and one of the schools has a propensity to sue those
who cause NCAA violations, be it agents or otherwise, it is only logical for
a student to choose the school that does not take such a hard-line position.
Needless to say, it is certainly better for a university to put violations
as far in the past as possible and not allow them to remain in the media or
public eye. In addition to hurting recruitment and the attractiveness of the
university to potential applicants who value a strong athletic program even
as non-participants, university legal action has a negative effect on an
institution's fundraising.163  Alumni and other donors are reluctant to
commit money to a troubled program or to a school whose name is being
eviscerated in the public media.' 64 In sum, when researching this area,
cases where universities sued agents or student-athletes to recover
157 See generally Stangel, supra note 36, at 151-52 (discussing in detail the potential
negative ramifications of a university bringing a suit to recover damages for NCAA penalties).
158 See id. at 151.
159 See id.
'60 Id.; see also Sudia & Remis, supra note 75 at 79-80 (disputing the NCAA's claim that
its athletic programs are meant to preserve "the spirit and educational value of intercollegiate
athletics" because schools do not have the same opportunity to win games and compete).
161 See Stangel, supra note 36, at 151.
162 Cf id. at 152 (postulating that the Internet greatly impacts the recruiting of high school
athletes and that students are very knowledgeable about the schools recruiting them, which
makes it difficult to recruit a student when the university has previously pursued legal action
against NCAA violators).
163 See id at 152.
164 Id.
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damages from NCAA violations were difficult to uncover. 65 In fact, there
is a relative dearth of such instances.
In addition to choosing not to sue students and agents over NCAA
violations, universities may simply be unable to successfully do so because
of their constructive knowledge of the violations. Pressure is placed on
coaches and athletic programs by alumni, boosters, fans, students, and
other entities, which creates a "win-at-all-costs attitude" 166 at many of the
larger Division I-A schools. "Big-Time" college programs regularly post
home attendance figures of over 100,000 people per game, possess more
funds and resources than smaller schools, and have a substantial recruiting
advantage because of their tradition and national prowess. 167 This pressure
causes coaches or other university personnel to engage in a type of "willful
blindness"'' 68 to the activities surrounding their program, including the
infiltration of agents and/or their runners. 69  There is a great deal for
colleges to lose if the program goes though an uncompetitive year because
of a recruiting drought. 170  This scenario presents a problem for the
university when one of its employees in a position of power knew or
should have known of the agent's conduct as it may make suit against the
agent impossible due to the school's constructive knowledge. 171
165 See, e.g., Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 16 N.C. App. 117, 121-22 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972)
(implying that the school had a cause of action against the student for breach of contract but was
not pursuing it); Williams v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 112 Ohio Misc. 2d 36, 47 (Ohio Ct. Claims
2001) (pointing out that the university did not seek damages against the student who willfully
violated NCAA bylaws and caused the school to be sanctioned and even allowed him to keep his
scholarship). But see Associated Press, Michigan Wants Webber to Pay Legal Fees (Sep. 18,
2003) (reporting that the University of Michigan will seek to recoup legal fees and lost
tournament earnings from former student-athlete, Chris Webber, for breach of contract for
knowingly causing NCAA violations), available at http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=
1618310.
166 Stangel, supra note 36, at 152-53; see also Sudia & Remis, supra note 75, at 79.167 See Sudia & Remis, supra note 75, at 79.
168 See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 160 (3d
ed. 2003) (describing willful blindness as the equivalent of knowledge in criminal law when a
defendant deliberately closes his eyes to what should be obvious to him). It is asserted here that
courts will be unlikely to grant damages to universities that knew of the ongoing NCAA
violations and did not attempt to stop them. It can be imputed that this is a type of contributory
negligence or high level of comparative negligence that will either reduce or eliminate any hope
of recovery.
169 See Stangel, supra note 36, at 152-53.
170 See FULKS, supra note 150, at 10 tbl.2.1 (detailing the revenues that Division I-A
universities take in from various athletic programs).
' See S. 1170, 108th Cong. § 6 (2003); H.R. 361, 108th Cong. § 6 (2003). While SPARTA
gives educational institutions a cause of action against sports agents in Section Six of SPARTA,
it does not lay out the elements of suit. However, it can be inferred that if the university knew
about a continuing violation and did not address it until it was sanctioned by the NCAA, at least
some of its damages, those from the continued violation, would not have been caused by a
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One's initial reaction to this may be that SPARTA does not deal with
the "willfully blind" university and that the law does not need to protect
unethical universities from questionable agents. However, this reaction
results from a misunderstanding of the purpose of SPARTA or the problem
in general, which, when introduced by Representatives Tom Osborne and
Bart Gordon, was primarily to protect the student-athlete.172 Therefore,
despite the fact that SPARTA may correctly disallow a university that was
at least partially at fault to recover damages from an agent who causes
NCAA violations, the athlete is still at a loss. The athlete loses his
eligibility and scholarship, and suffers other damages including damage to
his reputation. 173 The need to deter the sports agent from taking advantage
of the student-athlete is still present when the university is partially to
blame. Indeed, in dealing with a university that will not come down hard
on player-agent relationships, the agent has just cut off one potential
remedy against him. In summary, deterrents currently in effect are not
successful. Monetary penalties remain too low and universities, for a bevy
or reasons, are unwilling to pursue civil actions against agents.
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM
A. Congress Should Create a National Sports Agent Registry
The problem of sports agents' damaging activities is still very
prevalent. 174  While SPARTA's penalties may not be strong enough to
deter agents from taking advantage of athletes and causing universities to
be sanctioned by the NCAA, this Note proposes that there is a feasible
solution to give the bill the effect that its sponsors had hoped.1 75 Any
federal legislation should include a provision creating a national registry of
sports agents, on par with the registration requirements that many of the
states have enacted. 176  This national registry, really a federal licensing
violation of the act, but through the university's own ineptitude. Id.
172 Hearing, supra note 8, at 7 (statement of Rep. Tom Osborne); id. at 9 (statement of Rep.
Bart Gordon); see also H.R. REP. No. 108-24, pt. 2, at 33 (June 2, 2003) (stating that the purpose
of the bill is "to protect the often guileless student athlete from real-life consequences of dealing
with the unscrupulous [agent]").
173 See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (describing the damages that an athlete
may incur).
174 See supra Part I.175 See Hearing, supra note 8, at 7 (statement of Rep. Tom Osborne); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 108-24, pt. 2, at 33.
176 Many states have adopted the Uniform Athlete Agency Act, see infra note 183 and
accompanying text, which includes a registration provision. UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT §§ 4,
6, 8 (2000). The problem with the states' registry laws is that agents can remain in and make
contracts under the laws of states that do not require an agent to register with the state, thereby
2004] 1249
ST JOHN'S LA W REVIEW
system, can be used to monitor agent activities while serving as a
prerequisite to conducting business as an agent. 177 Congress should then
make it illegal for agents to enter agency contracts in the sports business
without having a federal license or being listed on this registry.'7 8 The law
should then make any commissions or other benefits to an agent forfeitable
if garnered by an unregistered negotiator.' 79 The prospect of forfeiture of
moneys would provide the necessary impetus for agents to at least register
or get the necessary license under the federal statute.
Once this national registry is in place, Congress must add to the list of
penalties for violation of SPARTA's third section 80 the possibility of
being removed from the registry either temporarily or permanently. This
would prevent agents from benefiting from agency contracts entered into
when their license was either suspended or revoked. If their contracts will
be declared void, there is little incentive for agents to expend time,
resources, and money chasing student-athletes.
The potential for losing one's ability to work as an agent should
motivate more agents to conform to the law. If agents know that they may
lose their livelihood if they behave unethically, the risks associated with
taking advantage of young athletes become exponentially larger. Instead
of facing minor fines and the remote possibility of suit, the agent may be
stripped of his ability to work in his chosen profession and, consequently,
frozen out of a billion dollar industry.
Congress must then couple the creation of a national registry with a
requirement that professional sports teams and other entities dealing with
professional athletes verify that the athlete-agent is indeed registered
before entering a contract with them' 8' or face the prospect of the contract
becoming void. Thus, the athlete will not be committed to a bad contract
entered into by an unregistered or unlicensed agent. This will further
protect the athlete from bad contracts that are otherwise difficult to escape.
avoiding ever having to register. See Hearing, supra note 8, at 7 (statement of Rep. Tom
Osborne). If states' laws were uniform, the registry would be very effective.
177 Cf UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT §§ 4-8.
178 See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT § 4 and CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18896 (2003) for
similar state registry laws.
179 State acts have similar provisions that make the contracts of unregistered agents void.
See UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT § 4; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18897.9.
180 See S. 1170, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003); H.R. 361, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003).
181 Cf Hearing, supra note 8, at 13 (statement of Scott Boras, Sports Agent and former
coach) (arguing that SPARTA should include "a provision requiring pro sports franchises to
report to the NCAA their meetings and discussions with student-athletes, and which agents
they've had contact with"). Boras argued that "Team representatives are invited to visit high
school and college campuses. They draft and sign the players.... [Therefore,] [t]he conduct of a
pro sports franchise should be subject to the same scrutiny as that of a sports agent." Id.
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If the team or endorsement company failed to check the registry, and the
agent was not licensed to work as a sports agent, then the contract could be
voidable at the athlete's behest. While this restriction seems harsh, it does
a great deal to protect the athlete at a relatively minor inconvenience for
the large corporations or sports franchises that employ them. As teams and
marketing firms will surely review the national athlete-agent registry in
order to protect their contracts, unregistered agents will have a difficult
time representing athletes as the industry polices itself.
SPARTA is not silent on the issue of creating agent registries and
licensing systems. Section Eight of the Act states "It is the sense of
Congress that States should enact the Uniform Athlete Agents Act of 2000
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, to protect student-athletes and the integrity of amateur sports from
unscrupulous sports agents."' 182  The Uniform Athlete Agents Act
("UAAA") has, as one of its centerpieces, the creation of a state licensing
system similar to the one proposed in this Note. 183  Unfortunately,
SPARTA steps short of actually implementing a version of the UAAA on
the national level and merely urges states to adopt the uniform law.' 84 The
UAAA would create "a comprehensive, uniform registration process that
will provide important consumer information for student-athletes, parents
and institutions, as they will have access to the detailed information
contained in the agent application.' ' 85 However, if the registry system is
implemented on just a state level, agents could escape prosecution or
license revocation in one state by moving to another.
86
Why Congress did not propose some sort of registry in SPARTA is a
conundrum. Perhaps Congress has Commerce Clause concerns in
promulgating such a mandate.' 87 However, it is clear that the sports agent
182 S. 1170, 108th Cong. § 8 (2003); H.R. 361, 108th Cong. § 8 (2003). As of June 2003,
sixteen states have already adopted the UAAA while twelve others have introduced it into their
legislatures. H.R. REP. No. 108-24, pt. 1, at 2 (2003) (reported by Representative Billy Tauzin,
Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce). Among the states that have not enacted
the UAAA, eighteen have some type of agent law(s) and the remaining sixteen have no law
addressing agent conduct. Id.
183 UNIF. ATHLETE AGENTS ACT §§ 4, 6, 8 (2000).
'" S. 1170, 108th Cong. § 8 (2003); H.R. 361, 108th Cong. § 8 (2003).
185 Hearing, supra note 8, at 14 (statement of William Saum) (noting that twenty-one states
have already adopted the UAAA).
186 See Hearing, supra note 8, at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Chris Cannon); Davis, supra note
129, at 1-2 (discussing the problems with current state registry systems).
187 149 CONG. REC. H4895, 4899 (daily ed. June 4, 2003) (statement of Representative
Steams postulating that the reason the bill may have been dropped from the 107th Congress was
because it was perceived as a federal mandate). But see H.R. REP. NO. 108-24, pt. 2, at 8 (June 2,
2003) (finding that the constitutional authority for SPARTA lies in the Commerce Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8).
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industry is interstate in nature as student-athletes attend schools in different
states, are represented by agents based in other states, and are eventually
employed by professional teams that compete across the country. In
United States v. Morrison,188 the Court held that, for a law to come under
the purview of the Commerce Clause, the statute must: (1) regulate
commerce or an economic enterprise; 189 (2) have an express jurisdictional
element that limits its reach to activities affecting interstate commerce; 90
(3) have legislative history showing the activity affects interstate
commerce; 19' and (4) show that the link between the regulated activity and
interstate commerce is more than just attenuated. 192  The contractual
relationship between the agent and athlete is commerce, or an economic
enterprise, because it involves employment and contracts across state lines.
While the jurisdictional element in the law is not clearly stated, Morrison
finds this is not fatal to a statute's constitutionality when the other factors
are very strong.' 93 Moreover, the legislative history surrounding SPARTA
is expansive, as has been detailed throughout this Note. 194 The regulation
of an agency contract that is purely intrastate in nature-which may be the
case in instances where agents and athletes are residents of the same state
and execute a contract in that state-affects interstate commerce in more
than an attenuated manner. Intrastate agent activities surely have a
substantial effect on agents from other states because they are competing
against one another for the same athlete and may take part in a "race to the
bottom" in order to sign the athlete. 195 The constitutionality of such a law,
therefore, is not likely to be in peril even under the strict Morrison test.
Admittedly, this is just a cursory examination of constitutional law and a
further assessment is still needed.
While prohibiting certain conduct as outlined in SPARTA, and
creating a national registry or licensing system in conjunction with those
prohibitions, will presumably dissuade some agents from engaging in these
activities, this is admittedly not a perfect solution. There will always be
agents that are outliers in the equation who are so desperate to break into
the industry that they will violate the law under any circumstances in order
to enhance their prospects of signing athletes. While, the possibility of
being removed from the national registry will not deter these agents, the
'8' 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
189 Id. at610.
'90 Id. at611-12.
191 Id. at 612-13.
192 Id.
193 See id. at 611-12.
194 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 108-24, pt. 2 (June 2, 2003).
195 See supra text accompanying note 3; Part IV.B-C.
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FTC fines and potential lawsuits may deter them, because to these agents,
a bevy of $11,000 fines and/or even a remote chance of facing a six or
seven figure judgment could deter them from breaking the law. Of course,
admittedly, there are other aspiring agents who just cannot be deterred.
Whatever the reason, Congress has failed to implement an effective
deterrent and regulatory mechanism. This is an area that needs better
regulation 96 and the federal government would be justified in creating a
licensing system or federal registry, monitored by the FTC, to control the
unscrupulous agent.
B. Other Potential Solutions
Other commentators have suggested additional changes that should be
made to SPARTA or added to future congressional attempts at regulation
in order to protect student-athletes. Most notably, Scott Boras, a former
coach and renowned sports agent,' 97 has suggested that the bill should
promulgate a civil action and remedy for student-athletes against agents
who damage them. 98 While athletes may have common law contract
actions for unconscionability, duress, or other overreaching, students do
not possess, by federal statute, the right to sue agents for damages caused
to their career, education, and reputation. Boras has argued that
[s]tudent-athletes and their families rarely understand the complexity of
the NCAA and professional sports rules. In most instances, athletes are
only left with the information that is given to them by a university or
outside counsel. The decision whether to forgo a college scholarship and
pursue a9vrofessional career requires sophisticated analysis and legal
counsel.'
Boras also postulates that Congress should better promote the use of legal
counsel in making these decisions and that any federal law should
differentiate between an agent who is pursuing his own interests and that
2(0
of an attorney, who is required to serve the best interests of his client.
Boras also believes that professional sports teams should have a duty
to report to the NCAA any dealings they have with agents and student-
athletes in order to better help the NCAA regulate itself and to deter agents
196 See supra Part I.A-D.
197 John Henderson, Saint or Elsewhere; After Bringing Salaries into the Stratosphere,
Those in Baseball Either Swear by Superagent Scott Boras or Swear at Him, DENVER POST, July
19, 1999, at D-01 (detailing Boras' immense success); Sara J. Welch, Scott Boras is the World's
Greatest Negotiator, 50 SUCCESSFUL MEETINGS 56, 56-57 (Nov. 2001) (illustrating Boras'
immense success).
198 See Hearing, supra note 8, at 13 (statement of Scott Boras).
199 Id.
200 Id. at 12-13.
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from acting to cause NCAA violations.20 1 Boras suggests that Congress
should allow the athlete to recover up to one million dollars in damages
from an agent who causes the player's collegiate eligibility to be
terminated.20 2 He proposes that this remedy will deter sports agents from
engaging in dishonorable practices because agents will be unable to count
on the athlete's secrecy in the agent's wrongdoing. 2 3
In addition to Boras's suggestions to strengthen SPARTA, Howard
Beales, the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the FTC, also
suggests that any bill should include a private right of action for student-
athletes against agents.204 He suggests that this private right of action may
be more appropriate than FTC action taken in the public interest, because it
would allow athletes to vindicate their rights in all situations, whether or
not FTC action is appropriate.20 5 He also suggests that the regulated
activities of the agent should be more in line with the NCAA Constitution
and Bylaws in order to prevent the loss of eligibility.20 6 For example, he
suggests that the NCAA rules prohibit the athlete from entering either an
oral or written contract with an agent, but SPARTA only referred to
written contracts. 207 Thus, he believes SPARTA or any federal law should
be nearly identical to NCAA rules so that there is no doubt about what the
law prohibits.
CONCLUSION
The current magnitude of the athlete-representation industry is
overwhelming. More and more prospective agents enter the market every
day and the competition among them propels many actors to engage in
overreaching and illegal activity. These agents purposely put athletes and
universities at risk of violating the NCAA Constitution and Bylaws and
execute unconscionable contracts with athletes. There is little
disagreement that a problem exists in this area.
While athlete-agent laws already exist in more than half of the fifty
states, national uniformity is greatly needed. Congress's attempt to
regulate this activity on a federal level through the Sports Agent
20 See id. at 13.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 See Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act: Hearing on 107 H.R. 4701 Before the
Subcomm. On Commerce Trade and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 107th Cong. 20-21 (June 5, 2002) (statement of Howard Beales, Director of the
Bureau of Consumer Protection at the Federal Trade Commission).
205 Id.




Responsibility and Trust Act is a much-needed step in the right direction.
Without uniformity, agents execute contracts in states without athlete-
agent statutes and take advantage of ambiguities in the law. However,
uniformity is not enough-adequate deterrents are also required. The
deterrents currently in effect on both a federal and state level are not strong
enough. They do not deter wealthy agents because the gains that can be
realized from signing star athletes more than offset any penalties or
lawsuits they will have to face for violating the law. Similarly, the
deterrents do not entirely discourage startup agents because these agents
are judgment proof.
To combat these problems Congress should create a federal
registry/licensing system for sports agents that would require athlete
contracts, both playing and endorsement deals, to be brokered by
registered agents only, declaring void or voidable all contracts
administered by agents who are not registered. Penalties should then
include revocation or suspension of an agent's license to deter them from
putting their livelihood in jeopardy through questionable activities that
may cause damages to athletes or universities. An amended SPARTA or
any other federal bill must include provisions similar to those of the
Uniform Athlete Agency Act regarding a registry system-merely urging
the states to adopt such a system is not enough.
The sports agent industry is a cutthroat competitive world where an
agent will do whatever it takes to land a client. This type of business needs
tougher penalties than those currently in place or proposed by Congress.
Currently, the prohibition on certain activities of agents is adequate, but
their enforcement provisions are deficient. In order for its directive to be
heard, Congress must come down harder on these agents.
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